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Our main topic is epistemic agency, which can be either free or unfree. 
This aligns with a distinction between two sorts of knowledge, the refl ec-
tive and the animal. We fi rst take up the nature and signifi cance of these 
two sorts of knowledge, starting with the refl ective. In a second section 
we then consider the nature of suspension and how that relates suspen-
sion to higher orders of meta-belief. Finally, we consider a distinction in 
epistemology between animal competence and refl ective justifi cation. All 
of these topics and distinctions are important for virtue epistemology, in 
ways to be considered.
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A. Introduction: Agency and Refl ection
Our main topic is epistemic agency, which can be either free or unfree. 
This aligns with a distinction between two sorts of knowledge, the re-
fl ective and the animal. We fi rst take up the nature and signifi cance of 
these two sorts of knowledge, starting with the refl ective.
Refl ection has two aspects: fi rst, refl ection as careful, conscious 
thought, as meditation; second, refl ection as thought that turns back 
on itself, as higher-order thought. The two aspects come together in 
Descartes’s Meditations. And both are present also in British Empiri-
cism, where refl ection is the operation of the mind by which it is con-
sciously aware of its own contents.
The two aspects are separable, since higher-order reference to one’s 
own mind can be subconscious. So we can distinguish two degrees of 
refl ection. A fi rst degree involves the mind’s turning back on itself, 
whether consciously or subconsciously. A second degree also requires 
the higher-order thought to be conscious.
1 What follows will lay out and extend key aspects of the virtue epistemology 
expounded most recently in my Judgment and Agency (Oxford University Press, 2015).
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Both aspects of refl ection are important in epistemology—both its con-
scious and its higher-order character—each in its own way.
The importance of the higher-order emerges, fi rst, with epistemic 
suspension of judgment. Suspension is constitutively a second-order 
mental phenomenon, or so I will argue shortly, in section B. The high-
er-order is also important, second, because of our aim to keep epistemic 
risk within proper bounds in our search for truth. This risk-assessment 
is inherently second-order. It is an assessment of how risky it would 
be to judge that p. Does the risk permit judgment, or does it require 
suspension instead?
So much for the higher-order. The importance of consciousness 
emerges in contexts of critical assessment, whether in private thought 
or in public dialectic, when one must weigh all pertinent reasons, while 
judging in light of the total evidence. Among the relevant reasons as 
one ponders a question is the fact that one already holds a certain belief 
on that question, if one does, even if it is just stored in memory. Take 
any context of critical assessment: that of legislation, for example, or of 
the courtroom, or the doctor’s offi ce, or the lab, or the criminal investi-
gation, or the philosophy seminar. Questions in such contexts must be 
addressed by weighing all the reasons in view. Yes, the fact that one 
already believes a given answer is among the reasons in view. But it 
cannot be allowed to trump automatically any contrary reasons that 
may also come into view. Nor will the stored answer necessarily out-
weigh the newly available reasons simply because of how very reliable 
is the perception-plus-memory that diachronically delivers that stored 
answer. A believer who has forgotten just how reliably he acquired 
and retained his belief cannot now draw the belief from storage with a 
weight determined simply by its diachronic reliability. The believer now 
needs reason to self-attribute such reliability. And this self-attribution 
will be on the second order and also conscious.
Refl ective knowledge of the highest degree involves refl ective 
thought that is both conscious and higher-order. This is the scientia 
that Descartes takes as his epistemic aim. It is knowledge consciously 
endorsed on the second order as reliable enough, as belief whose cor-
rectness manifests superlative competence. Here we have both com-
ponents required for appropriate refl ection of the higher sort. A fi rst-
order belief is endorsed consciously on the second order as one whose 
correctness manifests superlative competence.
Should we also allow a lesser degree of refl ective knowledge requir-
ing no conscious awareness? Nearly all one’s knowledge remains im-
plicit at any given time, and not all implicit beliefs are epistemically 
on a par. Only some derive from proper risk assessment, for one thing, 
and from a proper grasp of one’s relevant competence. Some are on an 
animal level, unaccompanied by suffi cient assessment of risk or grasp 
of competence, whether conscious or subconscious. For example, the be-
liefs of a blindsighter ignorant of his competence fall short epistemical-
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ly, despite their animal epistemic standing. We should thus recognize 
a distinction between knowledge that is merely animal and knowledge 
that is refl ective even subconsciously. This distinction is epistemically 
worth drawing not just because the knowledge that is thus modestly 
refl ective already seems superior in that respect to the knowledge that 
falls short. Our distinction is epistemologically signifi cant also for a 
further reason: because main traditional arguments for skepticism 
threaten refl ective knowledge irrespective of whether the second-order 
endorsement is conscious or subconscious.
What is that threat? We attain the refl ective level of knowledge only 
when we self-attribute the competence manifest in the correctness of 
a fi rst order belief. It is the ostensibly vicious circularity involved in 
seeking knowledge of such competence that poses the threat. The tar-
gets include fi rst order sources like perception, testimony, and intro-
spection, but also the faculties of armchair thought, such as rational 
intuition and deduction. Refl ective knowledge would allegedly involve 
a vicious circle or regress because it requires second-order endorse-
ment of the reliability of one’s fi rst-order sources. This gives us reason 
to distinguish between animal knowledge on one side, and refl ective 
knowledge on the other, whether this latter derives from subconscious 
or from conscious endorsement. Either sort of refl ective ascent would 
be blocked by the skeptic’s argument.
B. Suspension and Refl ection
1. What is suspension? 
Often enough the right choice when we consider a belief is not to en-
dorse it but to suspend judgment. Sometimes that is epistemically the 
right thing to do. What is involved in such suspension? 
What is it to suspend judgment on a given question? Is it just con-
sciously neither to believe nor to disbelieve while consciously consider-
ing the question? There are reasons to doubt that answer.
For one thing, that is what one does while still deliberating, undecided 
whether to suspend.
Secondly, what if one decides to suspend until further consideration? 
What about the suspending one does when the question has faded from 
conscious view? What constitutes one’s suspending at that point, when 
one is neither believing nor disbelieving, nor even consciously consider-
ing the question?
Objection: “One does already suspend while still deliberating, so one 
does not really deliberate on whether to suspend. One deliberates rath-
er on whether to continue suspending. As for suspension after one stops 
considering the question, this can just be a dispositional suspension, 
the disposition to forbear both affi rming and denying upon considering 
the question.”
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Reply: Fair enough. But consider what happens when one concludes 
inquiry. This might happen when one has “conclusive” evidence to af-
fi rm, or to deny. When one concludes inquiry, as when one concludes 
armchair pondering, this might be because one settles into an attitude 
of positive affi rmation, occurrent or dispositional, or of positive denial. 
One reaches a point where one fi nds it appropriate to settle into such an 
attitude indefi nitely. If one does not reach that point, this might be for 
either of two reasons. One might be in a position to settle indefi nitely 
into an attitude of double-omission, and this is the true suspending, the 
settled, conclusive suspending that might conclude inquiry in a way 
analogous to how affi rmation or denial might do so. Alternatively, one 
might stop inquiry by deferring it, not by concluding it. Here one con-
tinues either active or dispositional provisional suspension. This is not 
the settled suspension that is one of the three ways of truly concluding 
inquiry, along with settled affi rmation and settled denial.
2. Is suspension always second-order, irrespective of whether it 
is provisional or settled? Suspension is plausibly a second-order 
phenomenon, moreover, whether the suspension is provisional or 
settled. Let us look into this.
Compare fi rst one’s actions as one drives home while engrossed in con-
versation. There are many things one does intentionally while unaware 
that one is doing them. There are even choices that one freely deter-
mines without doing so consciously. When one puts on the brakes in 
response to a red light, one does so intentionally. One intends to do so, 
and one’s intention to put on the brakes derives from the combination 
of a certain policy and a certain perceptual belief. It might be thought 
that one intentionally does so with no prior or concurrent intention to do 
so. Even when thwarted by stuck brakes, however, one at least tried to 
stop. And what is it to try if not to act on a present-directed intention?
One might thus view suspending as intentionally neither-affi rming-
nor-denying. Moreover, this can be similar to the actions we perform 
automatically and subconsciously while driving. Such actions answer 
to intentions that derive by some sort of reasoning from policies that 
implicitly guide us.
Epistemic policies can concern, among other things, the evidential 
requirements for proper cognitive attitudes. And the attitude of main 
interest here is not just confi dence above a certain threshold. Nor is it 
just a stored state that can play its role unattended. Our focus now is 
rather on judgment, or on a disposition to judge, where to judge affi r-
matively is a distinctive all-or-nothing conscious mental act. Note well 
the distinction introduced. On one side is (a) the act of judgment, of 
conscious episodic affi rmation, of affi rming to oneself. On the other side 
is (b) a disposition to so judge. This latter is what we appeal to when we 
say of someone sleeping that “in his judgment” we should follow a cer-
tain course of action. We are not saying that he is at that moment per-
forming the relevant mental act. We are saying rather that he would 
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perform that act if he were then to entertain the relevant question with 
the aim of answering correctly.
Action-guiding belief can remain on an animal level when, being 
inexpressible, it is inapt for proper refl ective endorsement. It would be 
wrong to denigrate such deeply animal belief. Nevertheless, articula-
ble judgment is obviously essential for a social, linguistic, and rational 
species. By judgment I mean, again, either the act of affi rmation, in 
thought or speech, or the disposition to so affi rm when sincerely aiming 
to affi rm with truth. Something important happens when we conclude 
pondering and opt to judge (rather than suspend, or deny). Even if one 
has not yet voiced this judgment it is now ready for voicing, so that the 
information stored is suitable for sharing.
Suppose one could suspend without ascent to the second order while 
intentionally omitting both affi rmation and denial. Even so, proper sus-
pension is still plausibly second-order, since it cannot amount just to 
omission oblivious to the relevant risks. On the contrary, in order to 
be epistemically proper it must be properly responsive to such risks, 
which must be perceived adequately.
If proper suspension is plausibly second-order, since it requires in-
tentions that target fi rst-order conduct, also plausibly second order is 
then the judgment assessable epistemically in the same sort of way 
as suspending is assessable epistemically. Accordingly, such judgment 
would be fi rst-order judgment in obedience to second-order intentions 
that guide the believer implicitly.2
Granted, such judgment does differ signifi cantly from its paired 
suspending. On the fi rst order there is not much, if anything at all, 
that constitutes the suspending. Of main relevance on the fi rst order 
are simply absences: the absence of affi rming/believing and the absence 
of denying/disbelieving. What positively constitutes suspending lies on 
the second order. It is the intending to not affi rm/believe and not deny/
disbelieve, or to persist in doing so. Perhaps the forbearing that derives 
from that intending is on the fi rst order. I mean the forbearing con-
stituted by (intentionally) omitting affi rming/believing and denying/
disbelieving. But the being intentional of this double-omission derives 
from something constitutively positive and on the second order: name-
ly, the subject’s intention (conscious or subconscious) to not affi rm/be-
lieve and not deny/disbelieve. And this intention may implement an 
evidential policy (where the policy and the implied choice, the coming 
to intend, can be either conscious or subconscious).
2 This makes problematic the well-known view that epistemic reasons for 
believing that p are just reasons that bear positively on the truth of p. We now see 
why the pertinent epistemic reasons must likely bear (also?) on the epistemic risk 
undertaken by one’s own believing that p. As to whether the aim of belief is truth, 
a second-order aim here (also?) comes into view: The rational believer aims to take 
appropriate epistemic risk, no less and no more, in opting on the relevant threefold 
choice: affi rming, denying, suspending.
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3. How general is the interest of second-order assessment?
The interest of assessment on the second order goes beyond Pyrrhonian 
or Cartesian epistemology. Even in the most ordinary assessment of 
someone’s judgment as epistemically justifi ed or rational, the sort of 
rational justifi cation involved is often on the second order, or is at least 
dependent on the second order, since it is justifi cation of that judgment 
as superior to suspension, and concerns therefore a performance that 
is an alternative to suspension (or dependent essentially on an alterna-
tive to suspension). Such an alternative would be one among mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive options: affi rming, denying, suspending. If 
suspending constitutively involves the intention to not fi rst-order-be-
lieve and not fi rst-order-disbelieve, then plausibly the relevant alter-
native affi rming will constitutively involve the intention to fi rst-order 
affi rm, and the relevant alternative denying will constitutively involve 
the intention to fi rst-order deny.
The believing (and disbelieving) of interest now can be either oc-
current or dispositional. That is to say, it can be constituted either by 
an act of judgment or by a disposition to so judge. Either way, it is 
an intentional act or state. We have reached this result through the 
parity of such belief with its correlated suspending, and through the 
reasoning that supports our conception of such suspending as inten-
tional double-omission, whether the intention is consciously episodic or 
subconsciously ongoing.
That is so even if ordinarily one’s animal knowledge needs no re-
fl ective endorsement. Animal beliefs can often come under rational 
scrutiny, after all, in one or another setting where we focus on certain 
questions and beliefs, as in the law court, or the criminal investigation, 
or the doctor’s offi ce. And they can come under rational scrutiny more 
generally, as in the philosopher’s refl ection or seminar discussion. A be-
lief under such scrutiny is not properly affi rmed merely on the basis of 
its diachronic standing, no matter how excellent this standing may be. 
Synchronic justifi cation is now required, which imports second-order 
assessment of fi rst-order beliefs. Refl ective assessment need not but 
often does rely on such second-order inquiry, properly so. We must rely 
on it, of course, when our fi rst-order competence is itself explicitly un-
der attack. But we can rely on it also when we more directly scrutinize 
the fi rst-order question rather than the fi rst-order competence. We may 
need to base our continuing fi rst-order judgment on a positive view of 
our relevant fi rst-order competences.
4. What determines whether, on a certain question, suspending is 
epistemically justifi ed? 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, what justifi es our (intentionally) 
suspending is what justifi es our intending to withhold belief and dis-
belief. What justifi es our so intending? What might one endeavor to 
accomplish thereby? One cannot attain truth by forbearing from af-
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fi rming/denying and from believing/disbelieving. One’s objective in so 
forbearing is rather to avoid falsehood. One might conceivably pursue 
that objective by arbitrary suspending on the specifi c question. But the 
relevant objective is not just to avoid falsehood, but to do so properly, 
wisely, which requires attention also to the pursuit of truth. Cost/ben-
efi t analysis is required.
What are the costs and benefi ts relevant to epistemic choices? On a 
given question that one takes up, a main cost is false judgment or be-
lief, a main benefi t true judgment or belief. What is the likelihood that 
one will attain truth and avoid falsehood by affi rming? What is the risk 
that one will fail instead? A justifi ed attitude responsive to these que-
ries, be it judgment or suspension, needs to manifest epistemic compe-
tence.
In arriving at the correct attitude one must assess one’s level of 
complete competence with respect to the question addressed. This in-
cludes three components. The fi rst is one’s basic constitutional com-
petence, one’s skill in answering such questions. The second is one’s 
current shape for employing that skill. Is one awake, alert, sober, etc.? 
Third and last is one’s situation, including any relevant external rela-
tions. Is the light adequate? How far is the object? And so on. All three 
of these— skill, shape, situation—are constitutively involved in one’s 
complete competence. Only such complete SSS-assessment (however 
quick and subconscious) can properly determine whether one is likely 
enough to answer the question correctly. A negative conclusion would 
require one intentionally to forbear from answering. Instead one would 
need to suspend.
One affi rms with full epistemic competence, by contrast, only if the 
epistemic risk is competently assessed as low enough. One then affi rms 
on a basis shared with the intention implemented: the basis provided 
by the favorable risk assessment. One hence falls short in so affi rming 
unless that basis amounts to knowledge. It follows that the affi rmation 
will itself fall short unless it amounts to refl ective knowledge. In order 
to affi rm properly, one must answer the fi rst-order question correctly, 
manifesting thereby one’s relevant fi rst-order competence. Moreover, 
the exercise of that competence must itself be intentional, based on 
the second-order assessment of the relevant risk. Of course this assess-
ment must in turn manifest suffi cient competence.
Refl ective epistemic status is therefore a status above animal-level 
fi xation of belief, no matter how reliable the latter may be. This calls 
for an epistemology with both animal and refl ective components. Re-
fl ective competence is required for the higher epistemic status. We 
need not always be seeking that status, nor is it a status required for 
proper trust in our fi rst-order beliefs. Even when we need not, however, 
we often do seek that level of scrutiny and endorsement, as we consider 
a question in a setting that requires refl ection. Plausibly enough, more-
over, a belief would always attain a higher epistemic status if it did 
gain proper endorsement through such scrutiny.
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C. Animal Competence and Refl ective Justifi cation: the 
Interest of the Synchronic 
1. Much of our knowledge serves us well with no need of refl ection. It 
would be practically inadvisable to scrutinize the trust we place on our 
own stored beliefs, or on the testimony of others, as we go through an 
ordinary day. Such quotidian trust is appropriately blind, unaided by 
refl ection. Not so in the law court, or the legislature, or a detective’s 
investigation, or the scientifi c lab or philosophy seminar. These settings 
call for critical scrutiny; it will not do just to voice our stored animal 
beliefs or to take on trust the say-so of others. Questions here pres-
ent three options: affi rming, denying, suspending. Opting properly on a 
question under refl ective scrutiny requires a synchronic rational basis.
The fact remains that much everyday knowledge is not consciously 
refl ective. Such animal knowledge permits—may even require—blind 
trust rather than consciously deliberate choice. This knowledge will 
often have been acquired competently, reliably enough, and will have 
been stored through competent retentive memory. Once stored, it will 
have done its work unseen, with no need of conscious attention. Much 
of our animal knowledge is acquired through normal childhood devel-
opment, much absorbed from the culture. By contrast, the refl ective 
knowledge of interest to us is normally attained through the conscious 
weighing of reasons.3 Judgment-involving knowledge requires us to opt 
among affi rming (or reaffi rming), denying, and suspending. And this 
choice must be made in the light of the reasons available at that time. 
Suppose we can draw from storage an answer superbly acquired and 
retained. Even so, it would seem stubbornly irrational to just voice our 
belief despite the weight of synchronic reasons tilted against it.4
Judgment should be based on the total evidence available at the 
time. It must be so based in the law-court, the lab, the seminar room, 
and the criminal investigation. It takes priority when we must reason 
consciously to an answer for a question posed explicitly. The premises 
adduced in such reasoning ought not to be retrieved dogmatically from 
storage, not based just on the epistemic quality of the storage and re-
tention. The fi rst-order judgments that provide premises for critical 
reasoning require the rational support of any evidence synchronically 
available. Such rational support is required both for private thoughts 
in conscious reasoning, and also for public assertions whereby we con-
vey information to others by speaking on our own behalf.
True, we can often endorse what memory delivers if nothing in view 
tells against it. “Methodological conservatism” is thus right to bestow 
squatter’s rights on beliefs already in storage. Nevertheless, counter-evi-
3 Through “ratiocination”—to use Wittgenstein’s term in On Certainty.
4 Note well: “reasons tilted against it.” Again, this is supposed to be so despite 
whatever reason the believer may have—and it may be quite considerable—for 
conservatively trusting his own belief on the subject matter involved.
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dence synchronically in view might still properly trump the conservative 
claim of the belief in storage even when such synchronic evidence is far 
less reliable than the diachronic process that lies behind the stored belief.
2. Again, plenty of beliefs are initially acquired through competent in-
trospection, perception, or reasoning, and then stored in memory. Such 
a belief will often linger even after you forget how it was initially ac-
quired. You might then be able to say little more than “I just remem-
ber.” What then is the later standing of that belief?
We are focused on a time late in the life of the belief. No-one can 
now detail how it was acquired and retained. Suppose only slight di-
rect evidence is now available for its content. If we go by this evidence, 
the belief no longer counts as justifi ed. How competently can you now 
retain it? Its epistemic standing will now depend essentially on two 
things about your memory: fi rst how good it is for that sort of belief, 
second how well qualifi ed you are to assess it on that occasion. You 
must now assess how well your belief is likely to have been acquired 
and sustained. But your full competence for this second-order assess-
ment might be inferior to the competence that yields the belief itself 
on the fi rst order. First-order competence will often combine excellent 
perceptual acquisition with excellent mnemonic retention.
What then is the believer to do as time passes? Should confi dence 
dwindle in tandem with reduced qualifi cation to endorse? Consider 
the steady decay of the information required for endorsement. Despite 
such second-order weakening, the believer’s retentive memory can re-
main strong indeed. The retained belief is very probably true, given the 
perception that originally produced it and the memory that has kept 
it securely stored. That belief may thus constitute fi rst-order, animal 
knowledge of the highest quality. Quite often what decays over time is 
just the refl ective, second-order perspective.
Here is an example. At noon on a certain date you are mistreated as 
a child. You know extremely well that it is noon on that date. You store 
that belief for years, retaining it through excellent memory. In gen-
eral people would not remember so well. In general your own memory 
may not work so well. But it does in this case, on this sort of subject 
matter. That event stands out in your mind, and your memory of it is 
outstanding. The perception-plus-memory manifest in your continuing 
belief is of the highest quality. Compatibly with that, your second-order 
competence can decay. Just based on common sense, you may come to 
doubt your memory of that event. You may even learn that ostensible 
memory of such mistreatment is far less reliable than common sense 
had supposed. Human beings in general do not recollect as reliably as 
had been thought, especially not on such subject matter. By hypothesis, 
however, your memory is in this case extremely reliable.
That is one example of the phenomenon I wish to highlight. But we 
need not invoke abnormal powers. Another example might involve just 
normal human perception and memory. In combination these might 
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lead reliably to a correct present belief, even if the believer is now un-
able to detail how he acquired and retained his belief. He knows who 
directed a certain fi lm but cannot detail how he acquired that informa-
tion, nor how reliable his source may have been.
There can thus be a clash between the diachronic and the synchron-
ic, either of which can be excellent while the other is poor.
3. Our puzzle does not arise merely from a clash between externalist 
reliabilism and internalist evidentialism. The important clash is be-
tween two epistemic statuses that a belief can have:
First, there is the status a belief gains diachronically through the 
subject’s thinking and memory, no matter how internal such think-
ing and memory may be over time, nor how internal the subject’s 
initial data may have been.
Second, there is the status a belief gains synchronically through the 
support of reasons present to the thinker’s consciousness at that 
very moment.
The problem thus transcends two familiar divides: one between exter-
nalism and internalism; another between evidentialism and reliabi-
lism.
Such disparity between animal quality and refl ective quality would 
involve a divergence between 
fi rst, the high status a belief derives diachronically from a reten-
tion-involving fi rst-order competence, and
second, the lower status that same belief might have synchronical-
ly, due to the diminished epistemic quality of the believer’s second-
order competence, because it is less reliable or anyhow less produc-
tive of justifi cation. 
Earlier we considered examples of long-term memory. A similar ex-
ample involves arithmetical calculation. You may doubt your ability to 
perform a complex addition without fl aw (despite performing it fl aw-
lessly). Although initially you may have believed the result without a 
second thought, doubt sets in when you recall how unsure you are of 
your competence.
Suppose your refl ective capacity to endorse a given fi rst-order belief 
is thus diminished. What about your judgment itself, on the fi rst order? 
Here are questions on the fi rst order as you view a hand, or a fi re: Is 
this a hand? Is that a fi re? What attitude should you adopt on such 
questions within the privacy of your own thought, and what can you 
properly assert to others? Judgment, rather than suspension or inat-
tention, is required for conscious reasoning, and for proper assertion 
when speaking in your own person. 
Two issues thus arise concerning a pondered fi rst-order question. 
First, how if at all should it be answered? What attitude should you 
adopt from among the relevant three: judgment, denial, suspension? 
Second, how should you assess epistemically whatever attitude you do 
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adopt? For example, what determines the epistemic standing of your 
fi rst-order affi rmation/belief or denial/disbelief? Is it the quality of your 
total fi rst-order competence, including its diachronic components? Or is 
it rather the quality of your synchronic rationale, including the contri-
bution of your second-order competence to exploit what is synchronic-
ally available to it? These two ways of assessing a fi rst-order judgment 
might differ dramatically, since the two sets of factors can differ greatly 
in epistemic quality.
Again, it is not just the assessment of a fi rst-order judgment that 
may derive either from a fi rst-order animal competence or from a sec-
ond-order refl ective competence. There is also this question: Which 
perspective should have priority in determining how to judge on the 
fi rst order? Should you trust your excellent fi rst-order competence, or 
should you trump that competence once your belief is under scrutiny, 
with the inevitable bearing of the second-order perspective? Should you 
now decide whether to trump based on all the reasons presently avail-
able to you for conscious consideration?
Suppose we give priority to the reasons presently available. This 
in effect recognizes the bearing of a kind of refl ective knowledge, in-
volving a second-order judgment (or disposition to judge). This second-
order judgment itself depends for its standing on the quality of the 
competence that it manifests. Refl ective knowledge will thus enable 
your conscious reasoning, and sustain your place in the community as 
testimonial transmitter. Such refl ective knowledge is constituted by a 
judgment (or disposition to judge). Indeed it is regularly constituted 
by two such attitudes: one an endorsing judgment on the second order, 
and the other a judgment on the fi rst order—whether disposition or 
act. These attitudes often fi gure in our conscious reasoning, and in our 
sincere assertion when we inform others.
We have been considering this question: What should determine 
one’s act of judgment, and one’s disposition to so judge? Is it diachronic 
competence, even if its initial inputs have long receded, or is it rather 
the reasons synchronically available and operative? If we opt for the 
present-time-slice, we upgrade the second-order perspective. This is 
because synchronic reasons for stored beliefs are so often to be found 
within that perspective.5
5 Recall the examples wielded by internalists against reliabilist externalism, 
such as BonJour’s Norman, the clairvoyant-out-of-the blue, and Lehrer’s Truetemp, 
unaware of the thermometer embedded in his brain. In these cases too a belief derives 
with high reliability from some process or faculty relevantly beyond the subject’s 
awareness. Here again reliability clashes with rationality. But there is a signifi cant 
difference between those cases and our case of diachronic/synchronic clash. Our clash 
does not occur in remote, contrived examples. It is rather a familiar and pervasive 
feature of everyday cognition. Moreover, this diachronic/synchronic clash does not 
reveal a deep, unbridgeable chasm. On the contrary, consider the knowledge of 
the blindsighter, and our knowledge of simple math or logic. These cases plausibly 
suggest that rationality itself is to be explained at fundamental levels by appeal 
to relevant, reliable competence. Compare even a familiar bit of knowledge that 
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We have focused mainly on an important sort of belief that is not 
just a degree of confi dence above a certain threshold, nor just a stored 
state that subconsciously guides behavior, as when one conducts every-
day business on automatic pilot. Instead, the belief of interest to us is 
a judgment. It need not be an episodic conscious affi rmation. It might 
be the sort of judgment that one attributes to someone when one says 
“In his judgment, p.” This attribution can be correct even if the subject 
is not at that moment affi rming that p. A judgment can be constituted 
rather by a disposition to affi rm if sincere, to oneself or to others. This 
is a disposition to affi rm if under the infl uence of no conscious aim be-
yond answering the question correctly. Important synchronic reasons 
for or against such belief will often reside on the second order. What 
you can consciously affi rm depends on your synchronic rational basis. 
Endorsement of your stored beliefs may now turn on how well you can 
defend the quality of your acquisition-plus-storage.
4. Justifi ed judgment will thus involve your second-order competence 
to assess your fi rst-order competence. As memory dims on how you ini-
tially acquired your fi rst-order belief, you must increasingly rely on 
your epistemic self-trust. Suppose the fi rst-order belief to be put in 
doubt, either through overt disagreement, or through a challenge to 
your relevant competence. In responding you need to defend your com-
petence. You must now defend your belief from a second-order perspec-
tive on your relevant fi rst-order competence. After all, how properly 
you endorse that fi rst-order belief is determined by the reasons you 
may now have in view. A major portion if not the whole of this rationale 
will include whatever you can adduce in favor of your relevant fi rst-
order competences, and will reside on the second order.
you might have some morning: namely, that more than two seconds have elapsed 
since you awoke. You can have this knowledge even without having looked at any 
timepiece. Your belief is surely rational, moreover, even with no rational basis on the 
fi rst order. The corresponding seeming, the inclination to believe, is itself rational 
and justifi ed despite its lack of rational basis. What could possibly give it this status 
(an epistemic status withheld from a bigot when someone seems dumb to him based 
just on facial appearance; and withheld also from a gambler to whom it seems that 
7 or 11 will come up next).
What matters for human rationality is whether the relevant competence 
is a fundamental component of the human cognitive structure. And this reveals 
a further reason why human diachronic competence is epistemically important. 
Human diachronic competence differs importantly from the competences distinctive 
of Truetemp or of clairvoyant Norman. Human diachronic competence is after all 
a fundamental component of the human cognitive structure. For example, it can 
simply involve a familiar combination of basic perception with retentive memory. 
Yet it can clash with the rationale synchronically available to the subject at some 
later time. In order to proceed rationally, the subject must favor what is then, at 
that later time, available to his synchronic consciousness. The defense against 
diachronic reliability must in this way go beyond the defense against clairvoyant 
or Truetemp reliability. It must now appeal not only to what is fundamental to the 
human cognitive structure. It must also appeal to synchronic, conscious factors.
 E. Sosa, Knowledge, Refl ection, and Action 265
A belief that is apt through diachronic competence falls short if it 
is not endorsable synchronically through the balance of available rea-
sons. In that case you cannot rely blindly on your stored belief and on 
the diachronic competence that sustains it. Often enough only refl ec-
tive knowledge can fully serve our needs as conscious reasoners and 
speakers.

